What Do Compliance Detectors Read? An Audit of Activation Probes and Guard Models
Abstract
Regulatory compliance monitoring in deployed language models is increasingly implemented as a legal and audit control, checking model outputs against written rules spanning data protection, healthcare, financial regulation, and platform policy. Such monitoring is meaningful only if a detector's verdict depends on the stated rule rather than on surface features of the scenario. We show this condition fails across the current class of compliance detectors, a failure we call rule blindness. Deleting, permuting, or substituting the governing rule leaves detection accuracy unchanged for every guard and activation probe we test, including a policy-conditioned guard that correctly cites the governing clause's position ninety one to ninety five percent of the time yet barely changes its verdict when that clause is swapped for its permissive counterpart. A purpose-built benchmark crossing two rules with two scenarios, so that neither alone predicts the label, confirms the failure under a design no prior benchmark rules out, and shows that step by step reasoning, not any fast detector we test, is what escapes it. Testing this at scale requires a detector cheap enough to run across many guards and benchmarks without retraining, so we introduce the Internal Compliance Score, a training-free activation readout calibrated from ten labelled pairs and scored by a single projection. We hold it to the same scrutiny as the guards it is compared against, and a pre-registered criterion for beating trivial baselines is not met, and a bag-of-words model matches its pooled generalisation exactly. It remains useful because it is inexpensive, letting us audit four deployed guard models, an 8B zero-shot judge, and thirteen benchmarks with no prior guard comparison, and it raises the mechanically verified pass rate when used to rank candidate responses, though an adaptive white-box attack removes this gain. We release the counterfactual protocol, including the crossed-rule benchmark, so rule blindness can be tested for in future probe and guard claims.