
# **Bias Detection via Signaling**

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
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NeurIPS 2024

# People (or AI) are biased



**Anchoring Bias** 



#### **Confirmation Bias**

### Q1: How to quantify bias?

We adopt a linear bias model in the context of Bayesian reasoning from economics:

- An agent has to make a decision (choosing an action  $a \in A$ )
- There is a state of the world  $\theta \in \Theta$ , distributed according to prior  $\mu_0 \in \Delta(\Theta)$
- If the agent was perfectly Bayesian, then whenever receiving a piece of evidence (signal)  $s \sim P(s|\theta)$ , the posterior  $\mu_s \in \Delta(\Theta)$  should be  $\mu_s(\theta) = \frac{\mu_0(\theta)P(s|\theta)}{P(s)}$
- The agent has a bias towards the prior, measured by  $w \in [0, 1]$  (bias level):

$$\nu_s = w \ \mu_0 + (1 - w) \ \mu_s$$

• Based on their biased belief  $v_s$ , the agent makes an optimal decision:

 $a^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in A} \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \nu_s} [U(a, \theta)]$ 

### Q2: How to *detect* and *measure* bias?

- An agent has to make a decision (choosing an action  $a \in A$ )
- There is a state of the world  $\theta \in \Theta$ , distributed according to prior  $\mu_0 \in \Delta(\Theta)$
- If the agent was perfectly Bayesian, then whenever receiving a piece of evidence (signal)  $s \sim P(s|\theta)$ , the posterior  $\mu_s \in \Delta(\Theta)$  should be  $\mu_s(\theta) = \frac{\mu_0(\theta)P(s|\theta)}{P(s)}$
- The agent has a bias towards the prior, measured by  $w \in [0,1]$  (bias level):  $v_s = w \; \mu_0 + (1-w) \; \mu_s$
- Based on their biased belief  $v_s$ , the agent makes an optimal decision:

 $a^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in A} \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \nu_s} [U(a, \theta)]$ 

### We use information design:

design the " $P(\cdot | \cdot)$ " (signaling scheme) to infer whether  $w \ge \tau$  or  $w \le \tau$  (from the agent's actions) We can design signaling scheme  $\pi_t : \Omega \to \Delta(S)$ adaptively

# **Our Results**


The **Sample Complexity** of an adaptive algorithm for the bias detection problem is:

E[ time steps needed for the algorithm to output  $w \ge \tau$  or  $w \le \tau$ ]

#### Main Theorem:

- Constant algorithms are as powerful as adaptive algorithms.
- The optimal constant signaling scheme  $\pi^*$  can be computed by a linear program (with poly size)
- $\pi^*$  has the following properties:
  - $\pi^*$  recommends action  $a \in A$  to agent ("revelation principle")
  - Let  $a_0$  be the optimal action for the agent at the prior belief  $\mu_0$ . When  $\pi^*$  recommends action  $a \neq a_0$ , the agent's actual action reveals  $w \geq \tau$  or  $w \leq \tau$  (if actual action =  $a_0$ , then  $w \geq \tau$ ; if actual action = a or any  $a' \neq a_0$ , then  $w \leq \tau$ )

# **Geometric Characterization**





Scan here for details:

Bias Detection via Signaling. (NeurIPS 2024)

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