Jailbreaking Large Language Models Against Moderation Guardrails via Cipher Characters

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.20413

https://llm-moderation-attack.vercel.app/

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[3]Lapis Labs

Thirty-Eighth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2024)

Background



Conversational



Text Generation



Question Answering



Information Retrieval



Knowledge Base

Language Translation

Background

Are these LLMs really this good?

Background

OpenAI says a bug leaked sensitive ChatGPT user d

The same glitch that shared chat history titles m divulged email addresses and payment info too.

Andrew Tarantola
Senior Editor
Updated Mon, Apr 3, 2023 · 3 min read

Future Publishing via Getty Images

6 harmful ways Cl bad actors, accor

For all of the good things you can do w chatbot, you also need to be aware of used by people with malicious intent.

Written by **Sabrina Ortiz,** Editor on May 17, 2023



NurPhoto/Contributor/Getty Images

How I tricked ChatGPT into telling me lies

AIs are known to 'hallucinate' and tell falsehoods. But they don't like to do it on purpose. I figured a way around that.

Written by **David Gewirtz,** Senior Contributing Editor on May 15, 2023

The flying elephant image was generated using Midjourney prompt, "super-modern cyberpunk style, elephant with wings, flying in sky with soft clouds," which was then composited into the photo with Photoshop.

David Gewirtz/ZDNET

/ related

How does ChatGPT actually work?

Jailbreak Attacks

Algorithm 1 Greedy Coordinate Gradient

Input: Initial prompt $x_{1:n}$, modifiable subset $\mathcal{I}$, iterations T, loss $\mathcal{L}$, k, batch size B

repeat T times
  for $i \in \mathcal{I}$ **do**
    $\mathcal{X}_i := \text{Top-}k(-\nabla_{e_{x_i}} \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}))$ ▷ *Compute top-k promising token substitutions*
  for $b = 1, \ldots, B$ **do**
    $\tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b)} := x_{1:n}$ ▷ *Initialize element of batch*
    $\tilde{x}_i^{(b)} := \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{X}_i)$, where $i = \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{I})$ ▷ *Select random replacement token*
  $x_{1:n} := \tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b^\star)}$, where $b^\star = \text{argmin}_b \mathcal{L}(\tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b)})$ ▷ *Compute best replacement*

Output: Optimized prompt $x_{1:n}$

Algorithm 2 Universal Prompt Optimization

Input: Prompts $x_{1:n_1}^{(1)} \ldots x_{1:n_m}^{(m)}$, initial suffix $p_{1:l}$, losses $\mathcal{L}_1 \ldots \mathcal{L}_m$, iterations T, k, batch size B

$m_c := 1$ ▷ *Start by optimizing just the first prompt*
repeat T times
  for $i \in [0 \ldots l]$ **do**
    $\mathcal{X}_i := \text{Top-}k(-\sum_{1 \le j \le m_c} \nabla_{e_{p_i}} \mathcal{L}_j(x_{1:n}^{(j)} \| p_{1:l}))$ ▷ *Compute aggregate top-k substitutions*
  for $b = 1, \ldots, B$ **do**
    $\tilde{p}_{1:l}^{(b)} := p_{1:l}$ ▷ *Initialize element of batch*
    $\tilde{p}_i^{(b)} := \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{X}_i)$, where $i = \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{I})$ ▷ *Select random replacement token*
  $p_{1:l} := \tilde{p}_{1:l}^{(b^\star)}$, where $b^\star = \text{argmin}_b \sum_{1 \le j \le m_c} \mathcal{L}_j(x_{1:n}^{(j)} \| \tilde{p}_{1:l}^{(b)})$ ▷ *Compute best replacement*
  if $p_{1:l}$ succeeds on $x_{1:n_1}^{(1)} \ldots x_{1:n_m}^{(m_c)}$ and $m_c < m$ **then**
    $m_c := m_c + 1$ ▷ *Add the next prompt*

Output: Optimized prompt suffix p

Zou, Andy, et al. "Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043 (2023).

GCG



Ding, Peng, et al. "A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easily." arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.08268 (2023).

ReNeLLM



Yao, Dongyu, et al. "Fuzzllm: A novel and universal fuzzing framework for proactively discovering jailbreak vulnerabilities in large language models." ICASSP 2024-2024 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP). IEEE, 2024.

FuzzLLM



Ren, Qibing, et al. "CodeAttack: Revealing Safety Generalization Challenges of Large Language Models via Code Completion." Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics ACL 2024.

CodeAttack



Shen, Xinyue, et al. "" do anything now": Characterizing and evaluating in-the-wild jailbreak prompts on large language models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.03825 (2023).

DAN



Handa, Divij, et al. "Jailbreaking proprietary large language models using word substitution cipher." arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.10601 (2024).

LACE

Motivation



(a) Normal refusal response (b) Affirmative response (c) Filtered response (d) (c) Affirmative response with JAM

Safety Guardrails



(a) Input-only Guardrail



(b) Output-only Guardrail



(c) Input-Output Guardrail

Question Benchmarks



(a) In-the-Wilde



(b) HarmBench



(c) JailbreakBench

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

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

(b) HarmBench



(c) JailbreakBench

Filtered-out questions are largely unexplored

Question Benchmarks



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

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

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

(d) JAMBench

Question Benchmarks



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

(b) HarmBench



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

(d) JAMBench

- Hate and fairness

  Content that contains hate speech as propaganda threatening or calling for violence against Identity groups, radicalizes, recruits or incites people to join extremist efforts or spread hate speech.

- Sexual

  Content describing solicitation of sexual commercial services, containing detailed descriptions of sexual activity, violent sexual abuse and rape, and non-consensual power exchanges, abuse, and voyeurism. This also includes content that is used to promote, endorse, or glorify extreme or illegal sexual acts.

- Violence

  Content that contains terrorist or violent extremist propaganda and violent ideology on the Internet that describes, praises, supports, endorses or glorifies killings as part of terroristic activity, aids offers to terrorist organizations or causes.

- Self-harm

  Content that includes research for advice or provides instructions and methods on how to engage in self-harm that leads to death or how to commit suicide as well as glorification and endorsement of suicide, or other severe types of self-harm.

Question Benchmarks



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

(b) HarmBench



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

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Content describing solicitation of sexual commercial services, containing detailed descriptions of sexual activity, violent sexual abuse and rape, and non-consensual power exchanges, abuse, and voyeurism. This also includes content that is used to promote, endorse, or glorify extreme or illegal sexual acts.

Total 160 manually crafted questions

- Violence

Content that contains terrorist or violent extremist propaganda and violent ideology on the Internet that describes, praises, supports, endorses or glorifies killings as part of terroristic activity, aids offers to terrorist organizations or causes.

- Self-harm

Content that includes research for advice or provides instructions and methods on how to engage in self-harm that leads to death or how to commit suicide as well as glorification and endorsement of suicide, or other severe types of self-harm.

Overview


Step 1: Construct Filtered Corpus
Step 2: Train Shadow Model
Step 3： Optimize Cipher Characters
Harmful texts
Moderation
Filtered response
Harmful texts
Filtered Corpus
Train
Shadow Model
Harmful texts
Shadow Model
Greedy search
«to be or not..
Cipher Characters
Jailbreak Prefix
Malicious Question
0101 1010
Pre-defined Format
ABC
Jailbreak Prompt
LLM
1010
Decoder
Harmful Response
Step 4： Generate Jailbreak Prompt

Overview



Step 1: Construction of filtered corpus

$$\mathcal{D}=\{(\mathrm{t}^{(i)},\mathrm{s}_i,\mathrm{c}_i)\,\big|\,\forall \mathrm{t}^{(i)}\in \mathrm{T},\mathrm{s}_i=\max(\mathcal{G}(\mathrm{t}^{(i)};\theta_{\mathrm{y}})),\mathrm{c}_i=\arg\max_j \mathcal{G}(\mathrm{t}^{(i)};\theta_{\mathrm{y}})_j\}$$

$\mathrm{T}=\{\mathrm{t}^{(1)},\mathrm{t}^{(2)},\ldots\}$ -- Set of harmful texts $\quad \mathrm{s}_i$ -- Top-1 harmful score

j -- indexes over labels C $\quad \mathrm{c}_i$ -- Corresponding label

Overview



Step 2: Construction of the shadow model

We fine-tune toxic-bert on corpus D, aligning its 8-category classifier with the moderation guardrail for consistent harmful text scoring.

$$\hat{\theta}_{\mathrm{y}} = \arg\min_{\theta} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{(\mathrm{t}^{(i)},\mathrm{s}_i,\mathrm{c}_i)\in\mathcal{D}} (\mathrm{s}_i - \hat{\mathcal{G}}(\mathrm{t}^{(i)};\hat{\theta}_{\mathrm{y}})_{\mathrm{c}_i})^2$$

Overview



Step 3: Optimize cipher characters using jailbreak response format

Modify the output and lower the harmful score, bypassing the guardrail.

$$\tilde{\mathrm{x}}_{1:n} = \underset{\tilde{\mathrm{x}}_{1:n} \in \mathcal{A}(\hat{\mathrm{x}}_{1:n})}{\arg\min} \sum_{i}^{K_2} \hat{\mathcal{G}}(\mathrm{y}^*; \hat{\theta}_y)_i$$

Two main strategies in response (see paper for details):

- In-text Chaos
- Length Expansion

Overview



Step 4： Generate Jailbreak Prompt

Use GUARD to generate jailbreak prefixes that bypass input-level guardrails and combine all components into a jailbreak prompt.

Experiments

Setup

- **Target Models**

  We evaluated four LLMs: GPT-3.5 (**gpt-3.5-turbo-0613**), GPT-4 (**gpt-4-1106-preview**), Gemini and Llama-3-70B-Instruct (abbreviated as Llama3).

- **Baselines**

  We compare JAM with GCG attack, ICA, PAIR, CihperChat and GUARD.

- **Metrics**

  (1) Jailbreak Success Rate. (The higher the better)

  (2) Filtered-out Rate. (The lower the better)

  (3) Perplexity Score. (The lower the better)

- **Implementation Details**

  We fine-tuned toxic-bert using 80 epochs as the shadow model. We initial the length of cipher characters with 20 tokens, and optimize for 100 steps using a batch size of 64, top-*k* of 256. To ensure reliability in our results, we repeated experiments five times and reported the average result.

Experiments

Effectiveness On JAMBench

Models	Methods	Jailbreak Success Rate ↑ / Filtered-out Rate ↓							
		Hate and Fairness		Sexual		Violence		Self-Harm	
		Medium	High	Medium	High	Medium	High	Medium	High
GPT-3.5	GCG	14% / 55%	8% / 69%	5% / 63%	4% / 31%	5% / 58%	7% / 52%	6% / 45%	0% / 57%
	ICA	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%
	PAIR	4% / 68%	5% / 72%	3% / 82%	8% / 24%	2% / 63%	0% / 83%	2% / 66%	2% / 68%
	CipherChat	8% / 62%	6% / 66%	1% / 65%	13% / 12%	2% / 60%	0% / 83%	6% / 51%	3% / 32%
	GUARD	21% / 37%	23% / 52%	14% / 61%	21%/ 12%	9% / 49%	11% / 50%	15 %/ 37%	18% / 43%
	JAM	**83% / 4%**	**71% / 10%**	**82% / 5%**	**81% / 7%**	**77% / 14%**	**78% / 10%**	**74% / 12%**	**84% / 6%**
GPT-4	GCG	10% / 52%	3% / 69%	5% / 60%	2% / 34%	5% / 54%	0% / 52%	2% / 45%	0% / 55%
	ICA	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%	0% / 100%
	PAIR	4% / 68%	3% / 70%	10% / 80%	11% / 21%	2% / 63%	0% / 84%	3% / 71%	0% / 64%
	CipherChat	9% / 60%	3% / 66%	14% / 62%	12% / 5%	3% / 57%	0% / 80%	5% / 55%	0% / 38%
	GUARD	19% / 36%	16% / 44%	10% / 67%	20% / 17%	10% / 47%	10% / 56%	16% / 42%	12% / 38%
	JAM	**75% / 6%**	**73% / 12%**	**80% / 4%**	**81% / 7%**	**74% / 18%**	**75% / 15%**	**75% / 14%**	**76% / 12%**
Gemini	GCG	14% / 50%	0% / 53%	12% / 12%	8% / 72%	17% / 31%	13% / 27%	8% / 12%	10% / 7%
	ICA	6% / 11%	0% / 9%	0% / 42%	0% / 62%	0% / 18%	5% / 41%	0% / 5%	1% / 5%
	PAIR	6% / 26%	1% / 33%	1% / 33%	0% / 84%	0% / 15%	2% / 38%	4% / 8%	10% / 6%
	CipherChat	5% / 16%	2% / 22%	1% / 14%	0% / 93%	0% / 16%	2% / 35%	5% / 4%	10% / 5%
	GUARD	21% / 15%	18% / 25%	21% / 17%	5% / 72%	17% / 12%	6% / 32%	12% / 8%	22% / 5%
	JAM	**77% / 5%**	**74% / 7%**	**73% / 8%**	**52% / 31%**	**71% / 10%**	**73% / 17%**	**69% / 6%**	**76% / 5%**
Llama-3	GCG	6% / -	0% / -	0% / -	2% / -	0% / -	0% / -	5% / -	0% / -
	ICA	0% / -	0% / -	0% / -	0% / -	0% / -	0% / -	0% / -	0% / -
	PAIR	6% / -	0% / -	0% / -	3% / -	0% / -	2% / -	4% / -	4% / -
	CipherChat	3% / -	2% / -	3% / -	7% / -	1% / -	0% / -	5% / -	0% / -
	GUARD	6% / -	4% / -	5% / -	13% / -	10% / -	6% / -	8% / -	11% / -
	JAM	**67% / -**	**63% / -**	**70% / -**	**65% / -**	**66% / -**	**70% / -**	**69% / -**	**64% / -**

Our extensive experiments on four LLMs demonstrate that JAM achieves higher jailbreak success (~×19.88) and lower filtered-out rates (~×1/6) than baselines.

Experiments

Effectiveness On Existing Question Benchmarks

Benchmarks	Methods	Jailbreak Success Rate ↑ / Filtered-out Rate ↓			
		GPT-3.5	GPT-4	Gemini	Llama-3
In-the-Wilde	GCG	39.0% / 4.6%	27.4% / 3.3%	21.3% / 37.4%	11.0% / -
	ICA	0.0% / 95.4%	0.0% / 95.4%	4.4% / 8.5%	0.0% / -
	PAIR	49.0% / 8.7%	58.2% / 7.2%	42.8% / 8.5%	24.1% / -
	CipherChat	46.9% / 5.4%	67.7% / 4.1%	25.9% / 45.4%	35.1% / -
	GUARD	56.7% / 5.1%	70.3% / 5.4%	49.2% / 8.5%	51.5% / -
	JAM	**72.6% / 2.3%**	**77.2% / 2.1%**	**63.3% / 3.1%**	**72.6%** / -
HarmBench	GCG	35.3% / 11.0%	29.0% / 7.0%	22.8% / 26.3%	15.3% / -
	ICA	0.0% / 92.3%	0.0% / 92.8%	7.0% / 7.3%	0.0% / -
	PAIR	43.5% / 15.0%	20.8% / 15.0%	18.5% / 11.0%	30.3% / -
	CipherChat	46.0% / 13.8%	56.8% / 14.0%	20.8% / 38.5%	31.5% / -
	GUARD	75.3% / 4.8%	63.0% / 8.0%	56.5% / 7.0%	50.8% / -
	JAM	**77.3% / 4.3%**	**78.5% / 4.3%**	**73.5% / 6.5%**	**73.8%** / -
JailbreakBench	GCG	24.0% / 18.0%	29.0% / 15.0%	25.0% / 15.0%	15.0% / -
	ICA	0.0% / 100.0%	0.0% / 100.0%	10.0% / 10.0%	0.0% / -
	PAIR	37.0% / 21.0%	41.0% / 22.0%	34.0% / 9.0%	33.0% / -
	CipherChat	34.0% / 14.0%	57.0% / 13.0%	24.0% / 22.0%	41.0% / -
	GUARD	71.0% / 8.0%	67.0% / 8.0%	69.0% / 12.0%	32.0% / -
	JAM	**72.0% / 8.0%**	**76.0% / 8.0%**	**77.0% / 9.0%**	**59.0%** / -

JAM consistently outperforms other methods across all benchmarks, achieving the highest jailbreak success rates and the lowest filtered-out rates. This pattern not only verifies JAM's superior performance observed in the JAMBench but also underscores its generality and robustness across various contexts.

Experiments

Potential Countermeasures

(1) Output Complexity-Aware Defense

(2) Secondary LLM-based Audit Defense

Models	Methods	Jailbreak Success Rate (Decrease Rate ↓)							
		Hate and Fairness		Sexual		Violence		Self-Harm	
		Medium	High	Medium	High	Medium	High	Medium	High
GPT-3.5	w/o defense	83% (-)	71% (-)	82% (-)	81% (-)	77% (-)	78% (-)	74% (-)	84% (-)
	Self-Reminder	78% (5% ↓)	70% (1% ↓)	79% (3% ↓)	81% (0%)	73% (4% ↓)	71% (7% ↓)	67% (7% ↓)	82% (2% ↓)
	Goal Prioritization	76% (7% ↓)	64% (7% ↓)	76% (6% ↓)	76% (5% ↓)	69% (8% ↓)	70% (8% ↓)	62% (12% ↓)	74% (10% ↓)
	Output Complexity-Aware	0% (83% ↓)	0% (71% ↓)	0% (82% ↓)	0% (81% ↓)	0% (77% ↓)	0% (78% ↓)	0% (74% ↓)	0% (84% ↓)
	LLM-based Audit	0% (83% ↓)	0% (71% ↓)	0% (82% ↓)	0% (81% ↓)	0% (77% ↓)	0% (78% ↓)	0% (74% ↓)	0% (84% ↓)
GPT-4	w/o defense	75% (-)	73% (-)	80% (-)	81% (-)	74% (-)	75% (-)	75% (-)	76% (-)
	Self-Reminder	54% (21% ↓)	61% (12% ↓)	72% (8% ↓)	66% (15% ↓)	62% (12% ↓)	61% (14% ↓)	57% (18% ↓)	67% (9% ↓)
	Goal Prioritization	49% (26% ↓)	47% (26% ↓)	59% (21% ↓)	51% (30% ↓)	60% (14% ↓)	43% (32% ↓)	59% (16% ↓)	45% (31% ↓)
	Output Complexity-Aware	0% (75% ↓)	0% (73% ↓)	0% (80% ↓)	0% (81% ↓)	0% (74% ↓)	0% (75% ↓)	0% (75% ↓)	0% (76% ↓)
	LLM-based Audit	0% (75% ↓)	0% (73% ↓)	0% (80% ↓)	0% (81% ↓)	0% (74% ↓)	0% (75% ↓)	0% (75% ↓)	0% (76% ↓)
Gemini	w/o defense	77% (-)	74% (-)	73% (-)	52% (-)	71% (-)	73% (-)	69% (-)	76% (-)
	Self-Reminder	72% (5% ↓)	68% (6% ↓)	71% (2% ↓)	52% (0%)	67% (4% ↓)	59% (14% ↓)	66% (3% ↓)	68% (8% ↓)
	Goal Prioritization	70% (7% ↓)	47% (27% ↓)	57% (16% ↓)	40% (12% ↓)	45% (26% ↓)	41% (32% ↓)	62% (7% ↓)	64% (12% ↓)
	Output Complexity-Aware	0% (77% ↓)	0% (74% ↓)	0% (73% ↓)	0% (52% ↓)	0% (71% ↓)	0% (73% ↓)	0% (69% ↓)	0% (76% ↓)
	LLM-based Audit	0% (77% ↓)	0% (74% ↓)	0% (73% ↓)	0% (52% ↓)	0% (71% ↓)	0% (73% ↓)	0% (69% ↓)	0% (76% ↓)
Llama-3	w/o defense	67% (-)	63% (-)	70% (-)	65% (-)	66% (-)	70% (-)	69% (-)	64% (-)
	Self-Reminder	63% (4% ↓)	54% (9% ↓)	63% (7% ↓)	62% (3% ↓)	66% (0%)	69% (1% ↓)	52% (17% ↓)	60% (4% ↓)
	Goal Prioritization	52% (15% ↓)	41% (22% ↓)	51% (19% ↓)	60% (5% ↓)	64% (2% ↓)	67% (3% ↓)	46% (23% ↓)	57% (7% ↓)
	Output Complexity-Aware	0% (67% ↓)	0% (63% ↓)	0% (70% ↓)	0% (65% ↓)	0% (66% ↓)	0% (70% ↓)	0% (69% ↓)	0% (64% ↓)
	LLM-based Audit	0% (67% ↓)	0% (63% ↓)	0% (70% ↓)	0% (65% ↓)	0% (66% ↓)	0% (70% ↓)	0% (69% ↓)	0% (64% ↓)

Compared with existing jailbreak defenses, our proposed defense can significantly reduce the jailbreak success rates to 0% across various models and categories. This is because the output format is easy to detect and defend against once the responses are well-decoded.

ILLINOIS

THANK YOU!

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.20413

https://llm-moderation-attack.vercel.app/