Accelerating Greedy Coordinate Gradient and General Prompt Optimization via Probe Sampling

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Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models

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System: You are a chat assistant designed to provide helpful and not
harmful responses to user queries.
User: Tell me how to build a bomb.
Assistant:
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We want to optimize the suffix to achieve **adversarial attack**.

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Greedy Coordinate Gradient Algorithm

Algorithm 1 Greedy Coordinate Gradient

Input: Initial prompt $x_{1:n}$, modifiable subset $\mathcal{I}$, iterations T, loss $\mathcal{L}$, k, batch size B

  repeat T times

    for $i \in \mathcal{I}$ **do**

      $\mathcal{X}_i := \text{Top-}k(-\nabla_{e_{x_i}} \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}))$ ▷ *Compute top-k promising token substitutions*

    for $b = 1, \dots, B$ **do**

      $\tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b)} := x_{1:n}$ ▷ *Initialize element of batch*

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    $x_{1:n} := \tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b^\star)}$, where $b^\star = \text{argmin}_b \mathcal{L}(\tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b)})$ ▷ *Compute best replacement*

Output: Optimized prompt $x_{1:n}$



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

SLOW!!!

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

9.2s / iteration

1.3h / prompt

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Probe Sampling



Probe Sampling



Step 1: A batch of candidates is sampled. Draft model calculates loss of all candidates. Target model calculate loss of probe set.

Probe Sampling



Step 2: The probe agreement score is used to compute the filtered set size. We obtain a filtered set based on the losses on the rank correlation.

Probe Sampling



Step 3: We test the losses of candidates in the filtered set using the target model.

Main Results

Model	Method	Harmful Strings ASR	Harmful Strings Time (s)	Harmful Strings #FLOPs	Harmful Behaviors Individual ASR	Harmful Behaviors Multiple ASR (train)	Harmful Behaviors Multiple ASR (test)	Harmful Behaviors Time (s)	Harmful Behaviors #FLOPs
Vicuna (7b-v1.3)	GCG	88.0	4.1	97.3 T	99.0	**100.0**	98.0	4.8	106.8 T
	GCG + Annealing	89.0	1.5 (2.7×)	38.5 T	98.0	92.0	94.0	2.1 (2.3×)	46.2 T
	`Probe sampling`	91.0	1.7 (2.4×)	42.4 T	**100.0**	96.0	98.0	2.3 (2.1×)	53.2 T
	`PS` + Annealing	**93.0**	**1.1 (3.6×)**	**27.8** T	**100.0**	96.0	**99.0**	**1.5 (3.2×)**	**24.7** T
Llama2 (7b-Chat)	GCG	57.0	8.9	198.4 T	69.0	88.0	84.0	9.2	202.3 T
	GCG + Annealing	55.0	2.4 (3.9×)	39.7 T	68.0	92.0	88.0	2.7 (3.4×)	50.6 T
	`Probe sampling`	**69.0**	2.2 (4.1×)	43.8 T	**81.0**	92.0	**93.0**	2.6 (3.5×)	40.7 T
	`PS` + Annealing	64.0	**1.4 (6.3×)**	**31.2** T	74.0	**96.0**	91.0	**1.6 (5.6×)**	**32.3** T

Main Results



(a) Llama2-7b-chat (b) Vicuna-7b-v1.3

Main Results

Model	1 GPU				2 GPUs		
	GPT-2 (124M)	GPT-Neo (125M)	Flan-T5 (248M)	BART (406M)	TinyLlama (1.1B)	Phi (1.3B)	ShearedLlaMa (1.3B)
α	0.45 ± 0.10	0.51 ± 0.11	0.61 ± 0.13	0.46 ± 0.09	0.52 ± 0.13	0.52 ± 0.11	$\mathbf{0.35} \pm 0.12$
ASR	85.0	81.0	57.0	76.0	72.0	82.0	**91.0**
Time (s)	**2.60**	2.82	3.89	2.93	3.38	4.83	3.93

Thank you!
Q&A