Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck

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Background

- Jailbreaking with adversarial prompts



- Different forms of adversarial prompts



Motivation

How can we defend against these attacks? **Perturbation!**

- Fixed Perturbation: Losing key information



- Generative Perturbation: Computational cost is high



Information Bottleneck Protection



Existing Methods are Inadequate

Table 3: Comparison between our IBProtector and other defense methodologies.

Method	Finetuning	Filter	Support Ensemble	Information Extraction	Transferability	Support Black-box	Inference Cost
Fine-tuning	✔	✗	No	✗	✔	No	Low
Unlearning LLM	✔	✗	No	✗	✔	No	Low
Self Defense	✗	–	No	✔	✗	Yes	High
Smooth LLM	✗	✔	Yes	✗	–	Yes	Medium
RA-LLM	✗	✔	Yes	✗	–	Yes	Medium
Semantic Smooth	✗	✔	Yes	✔	–	Yes	High
IBProtector	✔	✔	Yes	✔	✔	Yes	Low

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective:

$$X^*_{\text{sub}} := \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha \underbrace{I(X; X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Compression}} - \underbrace{I(Y; X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Prediction}},$$

where, $I(Y; X_{\text{sub}}) = H(Y) - H(Y|X_{\text{sub}})$

Objective:

$$X^*_{\text{sub}} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

where, $X_{\text{sub}} = X \odot M$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective: $$X_{\text{sub}}^{*} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier I(X; Xsub)

$$I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) \leq \mathbb{E}_X \left[D_{\text{KL}}[\mathbb{P}_\phi(X_{\text{sub}}|X) \| \mathbb{Q}(X_{\text{sub}})] \right],$$

Give $p_\phi \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi :$ $\quad p_\phi(X_{\leq t}) = \pi_t | t \in [T]$

$M \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi(M|X) = \prod_{t=1}^{T} \text{Bern}(\pi_t)$ Define $\mathbb{Q}(M) \sim \prod_{t=1}^{T} \text{Bern}(r)$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[\pi_t \log(\frac{\pi_t}{r}) + (1 - \pi_t) \log(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}) \right]$$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective:

$$X_{\text{sub}}^* = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier I(X; X_{sub})

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[\pi_t \log(\frac{\pi_t}{r}) + (1-\pi_t)\log(\frac{1-\pi_t}{1-r}) \right]$$

- Enhance the coherence in X_{sub}

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}} = \frac{1}{T} \cdot \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \sqrt{(\pi_{t+1} - \pi_t)^2}$$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective:

$$X_{\text{sub}}^{*} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- The Informativeness Quantifier H(Y| Xsub)

$$H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}) = -\sum_{X,Y} p(X \odot M, Y) \log p(Y|X \odot M)$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} = \underbrace{-\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} \log p(Y_t|\widetilde{X}, Y_{<t})}_{\text{Cross Entropy}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} D_{\text{KL}}\left[f_{\text{tar}}(\widetilde{X}, Y_{<t})||f_{\text{tar}}(X, Y_{<t})\right]}_{\text{In-distrubution}}$$

Information Bottleneck Protector

- The framework of IBProtector



$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} + \alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})$$

informative, compressed, connective

Further Gradient-Free Version

Objective:

$$X_{\text{sub}}^{*} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\max_{\phi}\ \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\rho(Y;\hat{Y})] - \beta D_{\text{KL}}[p_{\phi}(X)||p_{\phi}^{\text{ref}}(X)]}_{\text{RL for Prediction}} - \underbrace{\alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})}_{\text{Compactness}},$$

where, $$\rho(Y;\hat{Y}) = -\frac{\gamma(Y)\cdot\gamma(\hat{Y})}{\|\gamma(Y)\|^2\|\gamma(\hat{Y})\|^2}$$

Defence Experiments

Lower Attack Success Rate, Higher Benign Answering Rate!

Table 1: Defense results of state-of-the-art methods and IBProtector on AdvBench.

Experiment		**Prompt-level Jailbreak** (PAIR)			**Token-level Jailbreak** (GCG)			TriviaQA
Model	Method	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	BAR ↑
Vicuna (13b-v1.5)	Original Attack	87.5%	4.034	3.008	82.5%	0.244	4.300	97.8%
	Fine-tuning	62.5%	2.854	2.457	32.5%	0.089	2.114	94.8%
	Unlearning LLM	66.7%	2.928	2.496	40.8%	0.123	2.537	92.2%
	Self Defense	44.2%	2.585	1.692	12.5%	-1.170	1.400	79.6%
	Smooth LLM	68.3%	3.115	2.642	24.2%	-1.252	1.767	90.9%
	RA-LLM	34.2%	2.446	1.832	8.3%	-1.133	1.411	95.2%
	Semantic Smooth	20.0%	2.170	1.525	**1.7%**	-0.842	1.058	95.7%
	IBProtector	**19.2%**	**1.971**	**1.483**	**1.7%**	**-1.763**	**1.042**	**96.5%**
LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf)	Original Attack	67.5%	3.852	1.617	27.5%	0.325	2.517	98.7%
	Fine-tuning	47.5%	2.551	1.392	12.5%	-0.024	1.233	97.0%
	Unlearning LLM	49.2%	2.507	1.383	12.5%	-0.084	1.258	**97.4%**
	Self Defense	45.0%	2.682	1.525	11.7%	0.208	1.492	92.6%
	Smooth LLM	43.3%	2.394	1.342	4.2%	0.189	1.100	95.2%
	RA-LLM	40.0%	2.493	1.362	4.2%	-0.070	1.116	97.0%
	Semantic Smooth	40.8%	2.250	1.333	10.0%	-0.141	1.417	96.5%
	IBProtector	**16.7%**	**1.315**	**1.125**	**0.8%**	**-1.024**	**1.000**	97.0%

Transferability Experiments

➢ Defend against other attack methods:

Method	**Vicuna** (13b-v1.5)			**LLaMA-2** (7b-chat-hf)		
	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓
Original Attack	88.6%	2.337	4.225	29.0%	2.167	1.883
Fine-tuning	26.8%	1.124	1.772	5.1%	1.597	1.192
Unlearning LLM	28.3%	1.127	1.815	5.1%	1.534	1.233
Self Defense	28.7%	1.291	**1.725**	8.7%	1.439	1.792
Smooth LLM	81.1%	1.673	2.168	35.5%	1.720	1.992
RA-LLM	54.1%	1.027	1.892	2.2%	1.484	1.253
Semantic Smooth	49.2%	0.417	2.022	5.1%	1.116	1.101
IBProtector	**18.9%**	**0.031**	1.854	**0.7%**	**0.608**	**1.036**

➢ Defense in the attacking loop:

Method	**Vicuna** (13b-v1.5)		**LLaMA-2** (7b-chat-hf)	
	Iteration ↑	ASR ↓	Iteration ↑	ASR ↓
Original Attack	6.06±6.17	92.0%	13.76±7.04	52.0%
Smooth LLM	5.86±4.73	96.0%	14.06±6.91	52.0%
RA-LLM	6.38±5.69	90.0%	13.32±7.09	58.0%
Semantic Smooth	8.40±6.62	86.0%	14.28±7.61	44.0%
IBProtector	**15.60±5.64**	**52.0%**	**16.18±6.06**	**36.0%**

➢ Protect other target models:



Further Experiments



(a) The Effect of α (b) The Effect of λ (c) The Effect of r

Figure 5: Ablation study of the PAIR attacks on Vicuna-13B.



(a) PAIR attacks on Vicuna-13B (b) GCG attacks on Vicuna-13B

Figure 6: Similarity of random perturbations and original attacks, a.k.a., the informativeness between X and X_{sub}. Red is our method, the others are the Smooth LLM adjustments for mask ratios k.

Low Computational Cost

Table 7: Theoretical costs of the inference phase of existing defense methods.

Method	Theoretical Cost	Simplify
Original Attack	$C_{\text{ori}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	C_{ori}
Fine-tuning	$C_{\text{sft}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$
Unlearning LLM	$C_{\text{unlearning}} = T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$
Self Defense	$C_{\text{self def}} = C_{\text{ori}} + (\lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}'\rvert \times c_Y)$	$\approx 2 \times C_{\text{ori}}$
Smooth LLM	$C_{\text{smooth}} = n \times [(1-k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
RA-LLM	$C_{\text{ra}} = n \times [(1-k)T \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
Semantic Smooth	$C_{\text{semantic}} = 2n \times [T \times c_X + T' \times c_Y + T' \times c_X + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y]$	$\approx 2n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
IBProtector	$T \times c_p + (1-k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \lvert\hat{Y}\rvert \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$

Method	PAIR $\rightarrow$ Vicuna	GCG $\rightarrow$ Vicuna	PAIR $\rightarrow$ LLaMA-2	GCG $\rightarrow$ LLaMA-2	Avg. Time
Original Attack	4.962±0.828	5.067±0.841	4.235±0.217	4.095±0.312	4.590
Fine-tuning	4.850±1.380	4.726±0.911	4.107±0.154	3.873±0.309	4.389
Unlearning LLM	5.014±0.781	5.128±0.643	4.233±0.373	4.042±0.643	4.604
Self Defense	9.551±1.843	8.413±1.438	8.780±1.224	9.208±0.988	8.988
Smooth LLM(one copy)	5.297±0.717	5.015±1.398	4.284±0.180	4.319±0.392	4.729
RA-LLM(one copy)	5.664±1.268	5.351±1.550	4.269±0.643	4.528±0.475	4.953
IBProtector	5.509±1.283	5.370±1.489	4.426±1.137	4.251±1.367	4.889

Future Explorations

- How to represent uncertainty when black box models are inaccurate



- Quantification of compression amplitude and parameter tuning strategy

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} + \alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})$$

Conclusion

- We propose IBProtector, the first LLM jailbreak defending method based on the IB principle in the perspective of information compression, and give a traceable objective function.

- The proposed IBProtector is empirically generalizable to different attack strategies and target LLMs, highlighting its potential as a transferable defense mechanism.

- The results show that IBProtector can successfully defend against adversarial prompts without substantially affecting LLMs' responsiveness and inference consumption.