# Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck


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# Background

- Jailbreaking with adversarial prompts




- Different forms of adversarial prompts



# Motivation

How do you defend against these attacks? **Perturbation!**




Smooth and RA LLM
Source: Robey et al. and Cao et al.



# Existing Methods are Inadequate

Table 3: Comparison between our IBProtector and other defense methodologies.

| Method | Finetuning | Filter | Support Ensemble | Information Extraction | Transferability | Support Black-box | Inference Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fine-tuning | ✔ | ✗ | No | ✗ | ✔ | No | Low |
| Unlearning LLM | ✔ | ✗ | No | ✗ | ✔ | No | Low |
| Self Defense | ✗ | – | No | ✔ | ✗ | Yes | High |
| Smooth LLM | ✗ | ✔ | Yes | ✗ | – | Yes | Medium |
| RA-LLM | ✗ | ✔ | Yes | ✗ | – | Yes | Medium |
| Semantic Smooth | ✗ | ✔ | Yes | ✔ | – | Yes | High |
| **IBProtector** | ✔ | ✔ | Yes | ✔ | ✔ | Yes | Low |

# Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

**Objective:**

$$X_{\text{sub}}^* := \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha \underbrace{I(X;X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Compression}} - \underbrace{I(Y;X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Prediction}},$$

where, $I(Y;X_{\text{sub}}) = H(Y) - H(Y|X_{\text{sub}})$

**Objective:**

$$X_{\text{sub}}^* = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X;X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

where, $X_{\text{sub}} = X \odot M$

# Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

**Objective:**

$$X^*_{\text{sub}} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier I(X; $X_{\text{sub}}$)

$$I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) \le \mathbb{E}_X \left[ D_{\text{KL}}[\mathbb{P}_\phi(X_{\text{sub}}|X) \| \mathbb{Q}(X_{\text{sub}})] \right],$$

Give $p_\phi \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi$ : $\quad p_\phi(X_{\le t}) = \pi_t | t \in [T]$

$M \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi(M|X) = \prod_{t=1}^{T} \text{Bern}(\pi_t)$ Define $\mathbb{Q}(M) \sim \prod_{t=1}^{T} \text{Bern}(r)$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[ \pi_t \log(\frac{\pi_t}{r}) + (1 - \pi_t) \log(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}) \right]$$

# Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

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$$X_{\text{sub}}^{*} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier $I(X; X_{\text{sub}})$

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[ \pi_t \log(\frac{\pi_t}{r}) + (1 - \pi_t) \log(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}) \right]$$

- Enhance the coherence in $X_{\text{sub}}$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}} = \frac{1}{T} \cdot \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \sqrt{(\pi_{t+1} - \pi_t)^2}$$

# Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

**Objective:**

$$X^*_{\text{sub}} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- The Informativeness Quantifier H(Y| $X_{sub}$)

$$H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}) = -\sum_{X,Y} p(X \odot M, Y) \log p(Y|X \odot M)$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} = \underbrace{-\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} \log p(Y_t|\widetilde{X}, Y_{<t})}_{\text{Cross Entropy}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} D_{\text{KL}}\Big[f_{\text{tar}}(\widetilde{X}, Y_{<t})||f_{\text{tar}}(X, Y_{<t})\Big]}_{\text{RLHF}}$$

# Information Bottleneck Protector

- The framework of IBProtector




$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} + \alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})$$

informative, compressed, connective

# Further Gradient-Free Version

**Objective:**

$$X_{\text{sub}}^{*} = \underset{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)}{\arg\min}\ \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\max_{\phi}\ \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\rho(Y;\hat{Y})] - \beta D_{\text{KL}}[p_{\phi}(X)||p_{\phi}^{\text{ref}}(X)]}_{\text{RL for Prediction}} - \underbrace{\alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})}_{\text{Compactness}},$$

where,
$$\rho(Y;\hat{Y}) = -\frac{\gamma(Y)\cdot\gamma(\hat{Y})}{\|\gamma(Y)\|^2\|\gamma(\hat{Y})\|^2}$$

# Defence Experiments

Lower Attack Success Rate, Higher Benign Answering Rate!

Table 1: Defense results of state-of-the-art methods and IBProtector on AdvBench.

| *Experiment* | | **Prompt-level Jailbreak** (PAIR) | | | **Token-level Jailbreak** (GCG) | | | TriviaQA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model | Method | ASR ↓ | Harm ↓ | GPT-4 ↓ | ASR ↓ | Harm ↓ | GPT-4 ↓ | BAR ↑ |
| Vicuna (13b-v1.5) | Original Attack | 87.5% | 4.034 | 3.008 | 82.5% | 0.244 | 4.300 | 97.8% |
| | Fine-tuning | 62.5% | 2.854 | 2.457 | 32.5% | 0.089 | 2.114 | 94.8% |
| | Unlearning LLM | 66.7% | 2.928 | 2.496 | 40.8% | 0.123 | 2.537 | 92.2% |
| | Self Defense | 44.2% | 2.585 | 1.692 | 12.5% | -1.170 | 1.400 | 79.6% |
| | Smooth LLM | 68.3% | 3.115 | 2.642 | 24.2% | -1.252 | 1.767 | 90.9% |
| | RA-LLM | 34.2% | 2.446 | 1.832 | 8.3% | -1.133 | 1.411 | 95.2% |
| | Semantic Smooth | 20.0% | 2.170 | 1.525 | **1.7%** | -0.842 | 1.058 | 95.7% |
| | IBProtector | **19.2%** | **1.971** | **1.483** | **1.7%** | **-1.763** | **1.042** | **96.5%** |
| LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf) | Original Attack | 67.5% | 3.852 | 1.617 | 27.5% | 0.325 | 2.517 | 98.7% |
| | Fine-tuning | 47.5% | 2.551 | 1.392 | 12.5% | -0.024 | 1.233 | 97.0% |
| | Unlearning LLM | 49.2% | 2.507 | 1.383 | 12.5% | -0.084 | 1.258 | **97.4%** |
| | Self Defense | 45.0% | 2.682 | 1.525 | 11.7% | 0.208 | 1.492 | 92.6% |
| | Smooth LLM | 43.3% | 2.394 | 1.342 | 4.2% | 0.189 | 1.100 | 95.2% |
| | RA-LLM | 40.0% | 2.493 | 1.362 | 4.2% | -0.070 | 1.116 | 97.0% |
| | Semantic Smooth | 40.8% | 2.250 | 1.333 | 10.0% | -0.141 | 1.417 | 96.5% |
| | IBProtector | **16.7%** | **1.315** | **1.125** | **0.8%** | **-1.024** | **1.000** | 97.0% |

# Transferability Experiments

➤ Defend against other attack methods:

| Method | Vicuna (13b-v1.5) | | | LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ASR ↓ | Harm ↓ | GPT-4 ↓ | ASR ↓ | Harm ↓ | GPT-4 ↓ |
| Original Attack | 88.6% | 2.337 | 4.225 | 29.0% | 2.167 | 1.883 |
| Fine-tuning | 26.8% | 1.124 | 1.772 | 5.1% | 1.597 | 1.192 |
| Unlearning LLM | 28.3% | 1.127 | 1.815 | 5.1% | 1.534 | 1.233 |
| Self Defense | 28.7% | 1.291 | **1.725** | 8.7% | 1.439 | 1.792 |
| Smooth LLM | 81.1% | 1.673 | 2.168 | 35.5% | 1.720 | 1.992 |
| RA-LLM | 54.1% | 1.027 | 1.892 | 2.2% | 1.484 | 1.253 |
| Semantic Smooth | 49.2% | 0.417 | 2.022 | 5.1% | 1.116 | 1.101 |
| IBProtector | **18.9%** | **0.031** | 1.854 | **0.7%** | **0.608** | **1.036** |

➤ Protect other target models:



# Low Computational Cost

Table 7: Theoretical costs of the inference phase of existing defense methods.

| Method | Theoretical Cost | Simplify |
|---|---|---|
| Original Attack | $C_{\text{ori}} = T \times c_X + \|\hat{Y}\| \times c_Y$ | $C_{\text{ori}}$ |
| Fine-tuning | $C_{\text{sft}} = T \times c_X + \|\hat{Y}\| \times c_Y$ | $\approx C_{\text{ori}}$ |
| Unlearning LLM | $C_{\text{unlearning}} = T \times c_X + \|\hat{Y}\| \times c_Y$ | $\approx C_{\text{ori}}$ |
| Self Defense | $C_{\text{self def}} = C_{\text{ori}} + (\|\hat{Y}\| \times c_X + \|\hat{Y}'\| \times c_Y)$ | $\approx 2 \times C_{\text{ori}}$ |
| Smooth LLM | $C_{\text{smooth}} = n \times [(1-k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \|\hat{Y}\| \times c_Y]$ | $\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$ |
| RA-LLM | $C_{\text{ra}} = n \times [(1-k)T \times c_X + \|\hat{Y}\| \times c_Y]$ | $\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$ |
| Semantic Smooth | $C_{\text{semantic}} = 2n \times [T \times c_X + T' \times c_Y + T' \times c_X + \|\hat{Y}\| \times c_Y]$ | $\approx 2n \times C_{\text{ori}}$ |
| IBProtector | $T \times c_p + (1-k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \|\hat{Y}\| \times c_Y$ | $\approx C_{\text{ori}}$ |

| Method | PAIR → Vicuna | GCG → Vicuna | PAIR → LLaMA-2 | GCG → LLaMA-2 | Avg. Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Original Attack | 4.962±0.828 | 5.067±0.841 | 4.235±0.217 | 4.095±0.312 | 4.590 |
| Fine-tuning | 4.850±1.380 | 4.726±0.911 | 4.107±0.154 | 3.873±0.309 | 4.389 |
| Unlearning LLM | 5.014±0.781 | 5.128±0.643 | 4.233±0.373 | 4.042±0.643 | 4.604 |
| Self Defense | 9.551±1.843 | 8.413±1.438 | 8.780±1.224 | 9.208±0.988 | 8.988 |
| Smooth LLM(one copy) | 5.297±0.717 | 5.015±1.398 | 4.284±0.180 | 4.319±0.392 | 4.729 |
| RA-LLM(one copy) | 5.664±1.268 | 5.351±1.550 | 4.269±0.643 | 4.528±0.475 | 4.953 |
| IBProtector | 5.509±1.283 | 5.370±1.489 | 4.426±1.137 | 4.251±1.367 | 4.889 |

# Future Explorations

- How to represent uncertainty when black box models are inaccurate




- Quantification of compression amplitude and parameter tuning strategy

$$\widetilde{\mathcal{L}} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{LC}} + \alpha\mathcal{L}_M + \beta(\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{KL}} + \mathcal{L}_{dr}),$$

# Conclusion

- We propose IBProtector, the first LLM jailbreak defending method based on the IB principle in the perspective of information compression, and give a traceable objective function.
- The proposed IBProtector is empirically generalizable to different attack strategies and target LLMs, highlighting its potential as a transferable defense mechanism.
- The results show that IBProtector can successfully defend against adversarial prompts without substantially affecting LLMs’ responsiveness and inference consumption.