Strategic Data Sharing between Competitors

Nikita Tsoy Nikola Konstantinov

INSAIT, Sofia University Sofia, Bulgaria

NeurIPS 2023

Tsoy & Konstantinov (INSAIT)

Strategic Data Sharing between Competitor

NeurIPS 2023

・ 「 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト

Motivation

• ML benefits operations



Motivation

- ML benefits operations
- ML heavily depends on data

Motivation

- ML benefits operations
- ML heavily depends on data
- Collaborative learning?

・ 戸 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト

INS

э

Tsoy & Konstantinov (INSAIT)

• Privacy (Kairouz et al., 2021)

・ 戸 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト

IT

INS

- Privacy (Kairouz et al., 2021)
- Free-riding (Blum et al., 2021)

- Privacy (Kairouz et al., 2021)
- Free-riding (Blum et al., 2021)
- Heterogeneity (Donahue & Kleinberg, 2021)

- Privacy (Kairouz et al., 2021)
- Free-riding (Blum et al., 2021)
- Heterogeneity (Donahue & Kleinberg, 2021)
- Competition

A (1) > A (2) > A (2) >

When competitors can profit from collaborative learning?



4/13

Tsoy & Konstantinov (INSAIT)

Strategic Data Sharing between Competitor

NeurIPS 2023

Methodology



Icons by Flaticon

Tsoy & Konstantinov (INSAIT)

< □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶ < □ ▶
NeurIPS 2023

5/13

INS

э

Methodology



Icons by Flaticon

Tsoy & Konstantinov (INSAIT)

Strategic Data Sharing between Competitor

NeurIPS 2023

General Framework

- Collaboration Scheme
- Oata Impact Model

Tsoy & Konstantinov (INSAIT)

Market Model

・ 戸 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト

INS

э

Case Study

- Full data sharing
- **2** Polynomial scaling law, $O(n^{-\beta})$
 - "Simplicity" parameter β
- Onventional market model of Dixit (1979)
 - \blacktriangleright "Competitiveness" parameter γ

・ 回 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト

Theorem (Informal)

 $\exists x(\gamma, \beta)$ such that firms collaborate only if both of them have enough data

$$\forall i \ \frac{n_i}{n_1+n_2} > x(\gamma,\beta).$$

x(γ, β) is increasing in γ.
x(γ, β) is increasing in β.



• Collaborative learning is not always profitable

IT

INS

э

- Collaborative learning is not always profitable
- Collaboration is more profitable when
 - The market is less competitive (small γ)
 - The learning tasks are harder (small β)

・ 戸 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト



We get similar results in different settings



Tsoy & Konstantinov (INSAIT)

Strategic Data Sharing between Competitor

NeurIPS 2023

We get similar results in different settings

• Full data sharing between two firms

▲ □ ▶ ▲ □ ▶ ▲ □ ▶

INS

We get similar results in different settings

- Full data sharing between two firms
- Partial data sharing between two firms

ING

We get similar results in different settings

- Full data sharing between two firms
- Partial data sharing between two firms
- Full data sharing between multiple firms

(4) (2) (4) (3)

Conclusion

• Downstream effects are important

Conclusion

- Downstream effects are important
- Even if collaboration is easy, firms might not want to collaborate

→ < Ξ > < Ξ >

ΙΝς

Conclusion

- Downstream effects are important
- Even if collaboration is easy, firms might not want to collaborate
- Sometimes, firms want to collaborate even without incentivization

김 글 🕨 🖌 글

Thanks for your attention! See us at Great Hall & Hall B1+B2 #1707 on Tue 12 Dec 5:15 p.m. CST



References I

- Blum, A., Haghtalab, N., Phillips, R. L., and Shao, H. One for one, or all for all: Equilibria and optimality of collaboration in federated learning. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 1005–1014. PMLR, 2021.
- Dixit, A. A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers. *Bell Journal of Economics*, 10(1):20–32, 1979.
- Donahue, K. and Kleinberg, J. Model-sharing games: Analyzing federated learning under voluntary participation. In *AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 35(6), pp. 5303–5311, 2021.
- Kairouz, P., McMahan, H. B., Avent, B., Bellet, A., Bennis, M., Bhagoji, A. N., Bonawitz, K., Charles, Z., Cormode, G., and Cummings, R. Advances and open problems in federated learning. *Foundations and Trends (n) in Machine Learning*, 14 (1-2):1-210, 2021.

▲ 圖 ▶ ▲ 国 ▶ ▲ 国 ▶ …