Poincaré Recurrence, Cycles and Spurious Equilibria in Gradient Descent Ascent for Non-Convex Non-Concave Zero-Sum Games.

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Our work

Takeaways:

i)

non-convex optimization combined.

This is the first **theoretical** paper that analyzes **vanilla GDA** in non-convex non-concave zero-sum games:

GDA does not solve always zero-sum games

ii) Many distinct failure modes provably exist including cycles and spurious equilibria.

iii) To understand these settings we need **physics** +

Motivation

Generative Adversarial Networks i)

ii) Adversarial Learning



iii) Multi-agent Reinforcement learning



"panda" 57.7% confidence

"gibbon" 99.3% confidence

0



Prior work: Bilinear Games

R Rock Example: U = PaperScissors

Zero Sum Game $\min_{\mathbf{x}\in\Delta_n}\max_{\mathbf{y}\in\Delta_m}\mathbf{x}^T U\mathbf{y}$

ock	Paper	Scissors	
0	-1	1	
1	0	—1	
-1	1	0	



This work: Hidden Bilinear Games

- This is a well-defined problem.
- The hidden structure identifies the correct equilibrium that is also meaningful.
- It is clear that the min/max solution does not depend on the operator.
- * GDA corresponds to the **indirect competition of players in the parameter level**.

- Hidden Zero Sum Grame
- $F(\mathbf{x}) = \left[f_1(\mathbf{x}_1) \cdots f_n(\mathbf{x}_n) \right] \qquad G(\mathbf{y}) = \left[g_1(\mathbf{y}_1) \cdots g_m(\mathbf{y}_m) \right]$
 - $\min_{F(\mathbf{x})\in\Delta_n} \max_{G(\mathbf{y})\in\Delta_m} F(\mathbf{x})^T U G(\mathbf{y})$





Our Results

- i) Convergence to spurious equilibria corresponding to stationary points of the operators F and G.
- ii) Cycling behavior around the equilibrium for continuous time GDA.
- iii) **Divergence** from equilibrium fo discrete time GDA.

GDA results in a variety of behaviors antithetical to convergence



Our Techniques Poincaré Recurrence Theorem

Energy conservation



Stable-Center Manifold Theorem

... and many more





Come to our poster Wed Spm #C220 To hear more





Thank you





