### Attacks Meet Interpretability: Attribute-steered Detection of Adversarial Samples

Guanhong Tao, Shiqing Ma, Yingqi Liu, Xiangyu Zhang







#### Legitimate input



C&W<sub>2</sub> attack



Model



#### Isla Fisher









Differences

(×50 times)



### Legitimate input



#### C&W<sub>2</sub> attack



Model





#### Isla Fisher











### Legitimate input

Pixel-wise Differences (×50 times)



#### C&W<sub>2</sub> attack



Model





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Differences

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Model





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### Legitimate input



#### C&W<sub>2</sub> attack

















Legitimate input

Pixel-wise Differences (×50 times)



C&W<sub>2</sub> attack

Idea: is the classification result of a model mainly based on human  $\bullet$ perceptible attributes?





Isla Fisher







Human



Input



Input

Landmark generation



generation

annotation



extraction









- Are there correspondences between attributes and neurons?
- If yes, how to extract corresponding neurons?

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  - Forward: attribute changes -> neuron activation changes
  - Backward: neuron activation changes -> attribute changes

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- If yes, how to extract corresponding neurons?
- **Propose: Bi-directional reasoning** ullet
  - Forward: attribute changes -> neuron activation changes
  - Backward: neuron activation changes —> attribute changes
  - Backward: no attribute changes -> no neuron activation changes



Input



Input









• Attribute witnesses

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The number of witnesses extracted is smaller than 20, although there are 64-4096

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Achieve 94% detection accuracy for 7 different kinds of attacks with 9.91% false

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  - neurons in each layer
- Adversary detection
  - positives on benign inputs
  - accuracy with **23.3%** false positives for face recognition systems

The number of witnesses extracted is **smaller than 20**, although there are **64-4096** 

Achieve 94% detection accuracy for 7 different kinds of attacks with 9.91% false

A state-of-the-art technique *Feature Squeezing* (NDSS '18) can only achieve 55%

### Thank you!

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