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Game Redesign in No-regret Game Playing
Yuzhe Ma · Young Wu · Jerry Zhu
Event URL: https://openreview.net/forum?id=eq07xSyogcb »

We study the game redesign problem in which an external designer has the ability to change the payoff function in each round, but incurs a design cost for deviating from the original game. The players apply no-regret learning algorithms to repeatedly play the changed games with limited feedback. The goals of the designer are to (i) incentivize all players to take a specific target action profile frequently; and (ii) incur small cumulative design cost. We present game redesign algorithms with the guarantee that the target action profile is played in T−o(T) rounds while incurring only o(T) cumulative design cost. Game redesign describes both positive and negative applications: a benevolent designer who incentivizes players to take a target action profile with better social welfare compared to the solution of the original game, or a malicious attacker whose target action profile benefits themselves but not the players. Simulations on four classic games illustrate our proposed redesign algorithms.

Author Information

Yuzhe Ma (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Young Wu (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
Jerry Zhu (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

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