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We consider three important challenges in conference peer review: (i) reviewers maliciously attempting to get assigned to certain papers to provide positive reviews, possibly as part of quid-pro-quo arrangements with the authors; (ii) "torpedo reviewing," where reviewers deliberately attempt to get assigned to certain papers that they dislike in order to reject them; (iii) reviewer de-anonymization on release of the similarities and the reviewer-assignment code. On the conceptual front, we identify connections between these three problems and present a framework that brings all these challenges under a common umbrella. We then present a (randomized) algorithm for reviewer assignment that can optimally solve the reviewer-assignment problem under any given constraints on the probability of assignment for any reviewer-paper pair. We further consider the problem of restricting the joint probability that certain suspect pairs of reviewers are assigned to certain papers, and show that this problem is NP-hard for arbitrary constraints on these joint probabilities but efficiently solvable for a practical special case. Finally, we experimentally evaluate our algorithms on datasets from past conferences, where we observe that they can limit the chance that any malicious reviewer gets assigned to their desired paper to 50% while producing assignments with over 90% of the total optimal similarity.
Author Information
Steven Jecmen (Carnegie Mellon University)
Hanrui Zhang (Duke University)
Ryan Liu (Carnegie Mellon University)
Nihar Shah (CMU)
Vincent Conitzer (Duke University)
Vincent Conitzer is the Kimberly J. Jenkins University Professor of New Technologies and Professor of Computer Science, Professor of Economics, and Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. He received Ph.D. (2006) and M.S. (2003) degrees in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University, and an A.B. (2001) degree in Applied Mathematics from Harvard University. Conitzer works on artificial intelligence (AI). Much of his work has focused on AI and game theory, for example designing algorithms for the optimal strategic placement of defensive resources. More recently, he has started to work on AI and ethics: how should we determine the objectives that AI systems pursue, when these objectives have complex effects on various stakeholders? Conitzer has received the Social Choice and Welfare Prize, a Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE), the IJCAI Computers and Thought Award, an NSF CAREER award, the inaugural Victor Lesser dissertation award, an honorable mention for the ACM dissertation award, and several awards for papers and service at the AAAI and AAMAS conferences. He has also been named a Guggenheim Fellow, a Sloan Fellow, a Kavli Fellow, a Bass Fellow, an ACM Fellow, a AAAI Fellow, and one of AI's Ten to Watch. He has served as program and/or general chair of the AAAI, AAMAS, AIES, COMSOC, and EC conferences. Conitzer and Preston McAfee were the founding Editors-in-Chief of the ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC).
Fei Fang (Carnegie Mellon University)
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