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Poster
Multiagent Evaluation under Incomplete Information
Mark Rowland · Shayegan Omidshafiei · Karl Tuyls · Julien Perolat · Michal Valko · Georgios Piliouras · Remi Munos

Wed Dec 11 05:00 PM -- 07:00 PM (PST) @ East Exhibition Hall B + C #220
in Theory -- Game Theory and Computational Economics »
This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called $\alpha$-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or $\alpha$-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.
Keywords: Multi-Agent RL · Game Theory and Computational Economics · Theory · Reinforcement Learning and Planning
[ Paper]  [ Slides] 

Author Information

Mark Rowland (DeepMind)
Shayegan Omidshafiei (DeepMind)
Karl Tuyls (DeepMind)
Julien Perolat (DeepMind)
Michal Valko (DeepMind Paris and Inria Lille - Nord Europe)
Michal Valko

Michal is a machine learning scientist in DeepMind Paris, tenured researcher at Inria, and the lecturer of the master course Graphs in Machine Learning at l'ENS Paris-Saclay. Michal is primarily interested in designing algorithms that would require as little human supervision as possible. This means 1) reducing the “intelligence” that humans need to input into the system and 2) minimizing the data that humans need to spend inspecting, classifying, or “tuning” the algorithms. That is why he is working on methods and settings that are able to deal with minimal feedback, such as deep reinforcement learning, bandit algorithms, or self-supervised learning. Michal is actively working on represenation learning and building worlds models. He is also working on deep (reinforcement) learning algorithm that have some theoretical underpinning. He has also worked on sequential algorithms with structured decisions where exploiting the structure leads to provably faster learning. He received his Ph.D. in 2011 from the University of Pittsburgh under the supervision of Miloš Hauskrecht and after was a postdoc of Rémi Munos before taking a permanent position at Inria in 2012.

Georgios Piliouras (Singapore University of Technology and Design)
Remi Munos (DeepMind)

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