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Poster
Efficient and Thrifty Voting by Any Means Necessary
Debmalya Mandal · Ariel Procaccia · Nisarg Shah · David Woodruff

Wed Dec 11 05:00 PM -- 07:00 PM (PST) @ East Exhibition Hall B + C #217
in Theory -- Game Theory and Computational Economics »

We take an unorthodox view of voting by expanding the design space to include both the elicitation rule, whereby voters map their (cardinal) preferences to votes, and the aggregation rule, which transforms the reported votes into collective decisions. Intuitively, there is a tradeoff between the communication requirements of the elicitation rule (i.e., the number of bits of information that voters need to provide about their preferences) and the efficiency of the outcome of the aggregation rule, which we measure through distortion (i.e., how well the utilitarian social welfare of the outcome approximates the maximum social welfare in the worst case). Our results chart the Pareto frontier of the communication-distortion tradeoff.

Keywords: Game Theory and Computational Economics · Theory
[ Paper]  [ Slides] 

Author Information

Debmalya Mandal (Columbia University)
Ariel Procaccia (Harvard University)
Nisarg Shah (University of Toronto)
David Woodruff (Carnegie Mellon University)

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