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Is Approval Voting Optimal Given Approval Votes?
Ariel Procaccia · Nisarg Shah

Wed Dec 09 04:00 PM -- 08:59 PM (PST) @ 210 C #40 #None

Some crowdsourcing platforms ask workers to express their opinions by approving a set of k good alternatives. It seems that the only reasonable way to aggregate these k-approval votes is the approval voting rule, which simply counts the number of times each alternative was approved. We challenge this assertion by proposing a probabilistic framework of noisy voting, and asking whether approval voting yields an alternative that is most likely to be the best alternative, given k-approval votes. While the answer is generally positive, our theoretical and empirical results call attention to situations where approval voting is suboptimal.

Author Information

Ariel Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University)
Nisarg Shah (Carnegie Mellon University)

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